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FUTURE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT:  
THE PROBLEM WITH PRIVACY, POVERTY AND POLICING 
  
Kami Chavis Simmons*   For decades, the reasonable expectation of privacy has been the 
primary  standard  by  which  courts  have  determined  whether  a  “search”  
has occurred within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The 
Supreme   Court’s   recent   decision   in   U.S. v. Jones, however, has 
reinvigorated   the   physical   trespass   doctrine’s   importance   when  
determining   whether   there   has   been   a   “search”   triggering  
constitutional protection. 1 Recognizing the unpredictability of the 
reasonable   expectation   of   privacy   doctrine   and   that   doctrine’s   bias  
against the urban poor, many scholars hope that the Jones opinion may 
ameliorate the class divide that has developed in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence.  
 
This Article argues that while Jones has reiterated that a 
physical trespass may trigger Fourth Amendment protection, this 
holding alone will not result in any appreciable strengthening of the 
privacy rights of the urban poor. The manner in which urban, inner-
city communities are over-policed and the aggressive law enforcement 
strategies employed in these areas, along with the current 
constitutional regime that has allowed these practices to flourish, are 
primarily responsible for the privacy inequities.2   
 
  In the United States, our political and economic structure has 
always allowed for a certain degree of stratification among different 
socio-economic groups. Privacy rights are changing for everyone. 3    
In our society, it is widely accepted that wealthier people are able to 
purchase lifestyles that may afford them more comforts than the poor.                                                          
*Professor of Law and Director of the Criminal Justice Program, Wake Forest 
University School of Law, J.D., Harvard Law School; B.A. ,The University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill.  I would like to thank Roger Fairfax, Michael Pinard, 
Yoland Vasquez, Kristen Henning, Andrea Dennis, and Renee Hutchins for their 
thoughtful comments, and Ashley Brompton and Paul Havenstein for their diligent 
research. 
1 U.S. v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
2 See generally William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 
67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1265, 1272 (1999). 
3 See, e.g., Michele Estrin Gilman, The Class Differential in Privacy Law, 77 
BROOK. L. REV. 1389, 1444–45 (2012). There is certainly an argument to be made 
that privacy rights are changing for all – especially those who can afford electronics 
or  devices  that  are  more  easily  “searched”  or  susceptible  to  government  surveillance.  
Id. 
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Such basic inequalities are a way of life. Society should, however, be 
less willing to accept the disturbing reality that income or wealth 
increasingly determines the amount of protection the Constitution 
guarantees.  Nowhere  is  this  “Constitutional  inequality”  more  apparent  
than   when   analyzing   the   Supreme   Court’s   Fourth   Amendment  
jurisprudence and its application in determining when the government 
has violated an  individual’s  privacy  rights.     
 
Scholars   have   long   argued   that   the   traditional   “reasonable  
expectation   of   privacy”   analysis   used   to   determine   whether   the  
government has violated the Fourth Amendment tends to disadvantage 
groups on the lower end of the socioeconomic spectrum because their 
jobs and homes (or lack thereof) afford them less privacy than their 
wealthier counterparts.4 William   Stuntz’s   discussion   of   this   dilemma  
in his 1999 essay entitled Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 
details how Fourth Amendment doctrine disadvantages the 
disadvantaged. 5 Since Stuntz published his essay, modest 
improvements in police-community relations may have occurred 
across the country, but for inner-city urban communities, tensions 
between police and residents have become exacerbated.6 The debate                                                         
4 See id. at 1392–93. 
5 Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1272–73. 
6 In recent years, policies such as stop-and-frisk in New York City have sparked 
criticism with many, arguing that the policy is implemented in a racially 
discriminatory manner. See Steven Zeidman, Whither the Criminal Court: 
Confronting Stops-and-Frisks, 76 ALB. L. REV. 1187, 1195 (2013) (“[T]he  NYPD  
brazenly uses Terry to defend, and perpetuate, vast numbers of stops-and-frisks and 
enormous  racial  disparities  in  who  gets  stopped.”). Several high-profile deaths of 
unarmed African American men have sparked mass protests nationwide; for 
example, on January 1, 2009, Oscar Grant was fatally shot by a Bay Area Transit 
officer in Oakland, CA. Michael McLaughlin, Ex-Transit Officer Who Killed Oscar 
Grant, Unarmed Black Man, Wins Lawsuit, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 2, 2014, 1:59 
AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/01/oscar-grant-lawsuit-bart-
officer_n_5548719.html. In New York City, Eric Garner, an unarmed African-
American man, died after being placed in a chokehold on July 17, 2014 after officers 
approached him for selling untaxed cigarettes. See James Queally & Alana Semuels, 
Eric  Garner’s  Death  in  NYPD  Chokehold  Case  Ruled  a  Homicide, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 
1, 2014, 9:24 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-garner-
homicide-20140801-story.html. Meanwhile, the now notorious killing of Michael 
Brown, an unarmed teen, in Ferguson, Missouri, has served to bring these inequities 
back into the mainstream consciousness. Wesley Lowery & Mark Berman, Police 
Wound Man Amid Protests Over Michael Brown Killing, WASH. POST, (Aug. 13, 
2014) http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/08/13/report-
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concerning   privacy   and   poverty   remains   relevant,   and   Stuntz’s  
proscriptions for shifting the Fourth Amendment from protecting 
privacy to other interests are perhaps more salient now than when he 
penned his essay. 
 
From the beginning, it is essential to note why this Article 
limits   its   discussion   to   privacy   issues   as   they   relate   to   the   “urban-
dwelling   poor,”   not   just   those  who   live   in   urban   areas,   and   not   just  
those who are poor. As I discuss below, the current standard for 
determining whether a search has occurred under the Fourth 
Amendment affords less privacy to those living in close quarters, 
hence the focus on urban area. In certain parts of the country, many 
impoverished residents may still live in single-family homes or in 
residential areas where police patrols and contact with police are less 
frequent than those within urban areas.7  
 
Furthermore, it is axiomatic that neighborhoods experiencing 
concentrated urban poverty also experience policing in a markedly 
different manner than rural or suburban communities with more 
affluent residents.8 It is widely known, for example, that   “[r]esidents 
of poor neighborhoods are more frequently subject to searches of their 
person in the form of overly aggressive stop and frisk tactics.” 9 The 
urban elite experience police protection in a different manner than 
those  who  live  in  “high  crime  areas”  and  generally  have  more  privacy                                                                                                                                    
police-wound-man-in-ferguson-protest-over-michael-brown-killing; see also Julie 
Bosman & Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Grief and Protests Follow Shooting of a 
Teenager, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/11/us/police-say-mike-brown-was-killed-after-
struggle-for-gun.html?r=0. 
7 William Stuntz clarifies this point by explaining that the urban poor, because of 
their class and location, are uniquely positioned to experience the inequities of the 
Fourth Amendment. Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1272 (explaining that while poverty is 
not exclusively an urban phenomenon, concentrated urban poverty creates its own 
set of issues – those who live in cities tend to live in apartment buildings and spend 
more time on the street, two situational contexts that afford them less privacy). He 
also notes that concentrated urban poverty has a racial dimension as well because 
poor blacks are more likely to live in cities, while poor whites are dispersed and tend 
not to live near large numbers of other poor whites. Id. at 1272–73. 
8 See id. at 1271. 
9 Amelia L. Diedrich, Secure in Their Yards? Curtilage, Technology, and the 
Aggravation of the Poverty Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 39 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 297, 317 (2011). 
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within their urban dwellings, such as 24-hour doormen, passcodes and 
other features that enhance the privacy of these residents. 10  The 
differences in the way law enforcement officers police and monitor the 
urban-dwelling poor is central to my thesis that the Jones opinion, 
with its emphasis on the physical trespass doctrine, will have little 
significance for the privacy rights of those living in these 
communities.  
 
This Article will explain how current Fourth Amendment 
standards afford less protection to economically disadvantaged 
citizens (particularly, the urban-dwelling poor) when compared with 
more affluent citizens. I will also argue that this jurisprudence is 
largely  unchanged  by  the  Court’s  recent  decision  in  U.S. v. Jones. 
 
In Jones, the Court relies on the physical trespass doctrine in 
finding  that  the  government  violated  a  defendant’s  rights  by  attaching 
a Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking device on his car and 
tracking the vehicle for nearly a month.11 In this way, the opinion in 
Jones does not reach the most pernicious government practices, 
including pre-textual traffic stops, which the Court has deemed 
Constitutional, and aggressive stop and frisk policies employed by 
many urban police departments. These tactics, which are employed 
almost exclusively in economically depressed, traditionally 
disadvantaged, and overwhelmingly minority areas, threaten the 
legitimacy of law enforcement in the precise areas that could benefit 
from increased cooperation between police and citizens to eradicate 
crime.   
 
Finally, while this Article ultimately concludes that Jones is 
not the catalyst for the desperately needed doctrinal change, several 
extrajudicial solutions are suggested to ensure fair and just law 
enforcement strategies within the most vulnerable communities. Thus, 
the goal of this Article is not to enter the debate about whether Jones’                                                          
10 See also Robin M. Collin & Robert W. Collin, Are the Poor Entitled to Privacy?, 
8 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 181, 189–93  (1991)  (asserting  that  “privacy  is  a  
commodity  which  is  bought  and  sold,”  leaving  poor  people  to  be  “compelled  to live 
in conditions where their economic condition affects their ability to satisfy their taste 
for privacy and may affect their ability to enforce privacy related rights against 
trespass  and  seclusion.”). 
11 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012). 
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emphasis on trespass will increase privacy protections for the urban 
poor, but rather to reiterate that, due to the manner in which these 
communities are policed, advocates should place more emphasis on 
extrajudicial means to improve the privacy rights of citizens. 
 
Part I of this Article will briefly summarize the current Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, and explain how the current framework 
could be construed to afford less protection to impoverished urban 
dwellers. In particular, this part will focus on the traditional 
“reasonableness   of   expectation   of   privacy”   analysis   as   articulated   in  
Katz v. United States.12 In this seminal opinion, the Court held that 
“the  Fourth  Amendment  protects   people,  not   places,”   and   found   that  
the   government’s   attachment   of   an   eavesdropping   device to the 
outside of a phone booth was a search within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment.13 This decision represented a dramatic departure 
from the decision in Olmstead v. U.S., in which the Court held that 
because no physical trespass had occurred, there was no search, and 
thus no Fourth Amendment violation. 14  It   was   Justice   Harlan’s  
concurrence in the Katz opinion, however, that would come to 
dominate the analysis that courts used to determine whether the Fourth 
Amendment had been implicated.15  
 
Since the Katz opinion, the courts have relied on the principle 
that the Fourth Amendment is triggered only when the government 
violates   a   “reasonable   expectation   of   privacy.”16 Simply stated, the 
Katz standard, as it has become known, means that if law enforcement 
agents can see, hear, or smell things that members of the public could 
see, hear, or smell, then there is no Fourth Amendment violation. It is 
easy to see the consequences that this doctrine may have on the most 
vulnerable in society. Stuntz perhaps best articulated this principle 
when he noted that, ironically, the Fourth Amendment protects those 
who already enjoy the most privacy.17  
                                                         
12 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
13 Id. at 351. 
14 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 
(1967). 
15 Katz, 389 U.S. at 360. 
16 Id. at 360–61. 
17 Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1266. 
Simmons   
2014]   FUTURE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 245 
 
 
Part II briefly discusses the U.S. v. Jones opinion and assesses 
whether Jones represents a doctrinal shift in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence that potentially could offer greater protections for the 
urban-dwelling poor. This section explains that while Jones has 
initiated an important conversation about privacy, the decision and its 
doctrinal underpinnings make it an inadequate tool to fully address the 
privacy inequity between the urban poor and other segments of 
society. Part II discusses how police tactics employed in 
neighborhoods experiencing concentrated poverty exacerbate the 
privacy inequities between these communities and other affluent 
communities, and therefore any solution, whether doctrinal or 
otherwise, must address these tactics in order to remedy the class 
divide in Fourth Amendment protections. 
 
Part III explains the fundamental flaws that exist within current 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that allow these inequities in 
privacy distribution to occur, thus preventing the incremental 
improvement that Jones makes   from   adequately   protecting   society’s  
most vulnerable citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures. The 
Court’s  seminal  decisions  in  Terry v. Ohio and Whren v. United States, 
despite their articulation of minimal constitutional standards, continue 
to detrimentally impact the urban poor by allowing investigatory 
detentions in the absence of probable cause and allowing pre-textual 
stops.18 Given the nature of criminal investigations in urban areas and 
the tactics officers use to police these areas, the concepts in Terry and 
Whren have a more direct application in that context than does the 
Jones physical trespass doctrine. Unfortunately, the standards in those 
cases allow too much discretion and are prone to arbitrary 
discrimination   against   some   of   society’s   most   disenfranchised  
members.19 
 
Part IV argues that given the inadequacy of Jones to correct the 
privacy inequities that exist between the urban poor and other groups, 
these communities should turn to legislative policy solutions rather 
than relying upon Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Community 
members must retain control of the criminal justice priorities in their                                                         
18 See Zeidman, supra note 6, at 1192 (explaining how Terry disproportionately 
affected men of color in highly policed neighborhoods); see also Stuntz, supra note 
2, at 1271–72 (explaining the parameters of Whren during traffic stops). 
19 Zeidman, supra note 6, at 1194; Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1293. 
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neighborhoods and should advocate for certain legislative changes to 
improve crime enforcement in these areas.  This section concludes by 
suggesting a number of legislative solutions that might spur changes in 
the manner in which urban neighborhoods are policed and could 
therefore ameliorate some of the Fourth Amendment concerns most 
relevant to those areas. 
 
I. KATZ: “THE REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY” STANDARD 
AND ITS IMPACT ON THE URBAN POOR 
 
A. Katz v. United States 
 
The Fourth Amendment states   that   the  “right  of   the  people   to  
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable   searches   and   seizures   shall   not   be   violated.”20 Prior to 
1967,  the  Court’s  decision  in  Olmstead governed the law of search and 
seizure. Olmstead held   that   if   the   government   trespassed   upon  one’s  
property,   there   was   a   “search”   that   triggered   Fourth   Amendment  
protection.21 Conversely, if there was no trespass, then there was no 
search, and thus no Fourth Amendment protection. Pursuant to this 
reasoning, the Court held in Olmstead, that there was no search when 
government  agents  intercepted  petitioners’  conversations,  because  the  
wires   they   used   to   do   so  were   “not   part   of   [a]   house   or   office,   any  
more than are the highways along which they are stretched.”22 Based 
on this formulation, the Fourth Amendment only protected searches 
and seizures of people and tangible items. Congress quickly responded 
by creating legislation prohibiting the government conduct at issue in 
Olmstead.23                                                           
20 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The  right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the places to be searched, and the persons to 
things  to  be  seized.”). 
21 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466. 
22 Id. at 465–66. 
23 See Jennifer Arner, Looking Forward by Looking Backward: United States v. 
Jones Predicts Fourth Amendment Property Rights Protections in E-Mail, 24 GEO. 
MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 349,  358  (2013)  (“Responding  to  the  Katz decision, 
Congress enacted Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 
1968,”  which  “‘prohibits  the  unauthorized  use  of  surveillance  techniques  .  .  .  by  
public and private actors, but permits law enforcement to use such techniques in 
controlled and well-defined  circumstances.’”). 
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Then, in 1967, the Katz Court explicitly overturned Olmstead, 
and  held  that  the  Fourth  Amendment  “protects  people  not  places”  and  
found that placing a listening device on top of a phone booth to 
intercept conversations that occurred within that phone booth 
constituted a search, despite the fact that there was no physical 
trespass.24 In   Justice   Harlan’s   concurrence,   he   famously   proclaimed  
that the test for whether the Fourth Amendment was applicable 
required a two-part analysis to determine whether the person exhibited 
an actual subjective expectation of privacy and that this expectation 
was one that society would recognize as objectively reasonable.25 It is 
in the concurrence that Harlan articulates the proposition that 
government   activity   that   violates   “the   reasonable   expectation   of 
privacy”  constitutes  a  search.26  
 
The Katz opinion   now  meant   that   there   could   be   a   “search” 
within the Fourth Amendment, even if no physical trespass occurred. 
 
B. Critiquing Katz and its Impact on the Privacy Rights of the 
Urban Poor 
 
Critics have characterized the Katz opinion   as   “poorly  
reasoned”  for  several  reasons.  Arnold  Loewy  explains  that  the  notion  
that   the   “Fourth   Amendment   protects   people   not   places”   is  
troublesome  because  “the  amount  of  protection  a  person  receives,  both  
prior to and after the Katz opinion, is   “completely   dependent   upon  
‘place.’”27 For example, Loewy points out that a person’s  home  almost  
always requires probable cause and a warrant, while searches of other 
effects, such as a car, can be searched in the absence of a warrant or 
with less than probable cause.28 
 
In addition to setting forth an amorphous standard for 
determining whether the government activity in question implicates                                                         
24 Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. 
25 Id. at 361. 
26 Id. at 361–62. 
27 Arnold H. Loewy, United States v. Jones: Return to Trespass- Good News or Bad, 
82 MISS. L.J. 879, 880 (2013). 
28 Id. (citing Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987) (upholding a warrantless 
inventory search of a vehicle as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment). 
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the Fourth Amendment, critics have expressed concerns that the 
“reasonable   expectation   of   privacy”   standard, could detrimentally 
impact the rights of poor or economically disadvantaged groups.29  
The argument that the reasonable expectation of privacy standard 
detrimentally impacts the poor stems from the current jurisprudence 
and the primacy it affords the home under the Fourth Amendment. In 
recent years, prior to Jones, the Court had reiterated the special 
prominence the home receives under the Fourth Amendment.30 The 
home enjoys the greatest constitutional protection because government 
surveillance is not constitutionally authorized without a judicially 
approved warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement.31 
   
The curtilage, or area outside the home which is associated 
with intimate home-like activities, also enjoys constitutional                                                         
29 Gilman, supra note 3, at 1392–93 (asserting  that  “people  who  live in crowded, 
urban  neighborhoods  and  who  cannot  afford  ‘a  freestanding  home,  fences,  [and]  
lawns,’  have  a  lowered  expectation  of  privacy  and  are  thus  more  likely  to  suffer  
warrantless  searches  by  government  agents”  (quoting  Christopher  Slobogin,  The 
Poverty Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 55 FLA. L. REV. 391, 401–05 
(2003))). See also Michele Benedetto Neitz, Socioeconomic Bias in the Judiciary, 
61 CLEV. ST. L. REV.  137,  155  (2013)  (purporting  that  “while  wealthy  persons  are  
able to protect their privacy  with  ‘the  aid  of  electric  gates,  tall  fences,  security  
booths, remote cameras, motions sensors  and  roving  patrols,’…those who are not 
able  to  afford  such  protections  will  be  subject  to  police  searches  on  their  property”  
(citing United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(Kozinski, J., dissenting))). 
30 The primacy of the home can be illustrated by examining two similar cases: in 
U.S. v. Knotts, which involved the use of a device by police to electronically track 
the movements of a suspect along public roads, the Court held that monitoring the 
suspect’s  movements  did  not  constitute  a  search  because  these  movements  occurred  
in public, and therefore did not implicate the Fourth Amendment. 460 U.S. 276, 281–
82 (1983). However, in U.S. v. Karo, which involved government tracking of the 
movement of chemical drums, the Court held that while tracking drums on the street 
did not constitute a search, the Fourth Amendment was implicated once the drums 
were tracked inside the house. 468 U.S. 705, 715–16 (1984). 
31  See Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1865 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
The  dissent  argued  that  “searches  and  seizures  inside  a  home  without  a  warrant  are  
presumptively  unreasonable.”  Id. (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 
(2006). This is because  “home  intrusions…are  indeed  ‘the chief evil against 
which…the  Fourth  Amendment  is  directed.’”  Id. (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 
U.S. 573, 585, 1379 (1980)). See also Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1269 (noting that 
“Fourth Amendment  law  regulates  house  searches  more  than  anything  else”  and  that  
“homes  are  almost  the  only  place  where  the  warrant  requirement  remains  
meaningful.”). 
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protection. 32  Recently, in Florida v. Jardines, the Court held that 
conducting  an  investigation  on  a  homeowner’s  front  porch  by  use  of  a  
drug-sniffing   dog   constitutes   a   “search”   within   the   meaning   of   the  
Fourth Amendment.33 The  Court  reasoned  that  a  man’s  right  to  be  free  
from unreasonable government intrusion in his own home is 
enumerated and at the very core of the Fourth Amendment.34 The front 
porch  of  a  home  has  long  been  held  to  be  within  the  “curtilage”  of  that  
home   and   therefore,   equally   safe   from   the   government’s   physical  
intrusion  upon  “persons,  houses,  papers,  or  effects.”35 The curtilage, or 
area  around  a  home,  is  “intimately  linked  to  the  home,  both  physically  
and psychologically,”  and  lends  itself   to   the  most  heightened  privacy  
expectations.36 As per our daily experience,  the  “activity  of  home  life  
extends”   to   the   front   porch,   making   it   the   “classic   exemplar”   of  
curtilage.37 Because  the  officers’  investigation  took  place  on  Jardines’  
front porch, the constitutionally protected curtilage of his home, the 
investigation constituted   a   “search.” 38  This search would only be 
constitutional  if  the  officers’  conduct  during  the  search  was  a  licensed  
physical intrusion. 39 
 
Thus, it is clear that activity that takes place within a home is 
subject to less scrutiny than activity that takes place outside the 
confines of this constitutionally sacred space. Logically, at one end of 
the spectrum, those who are homeless are forced to expose much of 
their behavior and belonging in public spaces in which they do not 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy, and thus no Fourth 
Amendment protection. 40  As one scholar noted, the   “homeless   are  
essentially   unprotected   by   government   surveillance”   under   the  
“reasonable  expectation  of  privacy”  standard  because  of  the  following                                                          
32 Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414–15 (2013). 
33 Id. at 1415. 
34 Id. at 1414. 
35 Id. (quoting United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950–51, n.3 (2012)). 
36 Id. at 1415 (quoting California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986)). 
37 Id. (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 182 , n.12 (1984)). 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 1415–16. 
40 See David Reinbach, The Home Not the Homeless: What the Fourth Amendment 
has Historically Protected and Where the Law is Going After Jones, 47 U.S.F.L. 
REV. 377, 381–85 (2012) (arguing that the reasonable expectation of privacy 
standard does not adequately protect the homeless because of the prominence the 
home is given under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).  
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four reasons: their activities are, by necessity, conducted in public; 
they  typically  make  their  “home”  on  property  that  they  are  not  entitled  
to be on; their belongings and activities   are   on   “open   fields”  which 
common passersby can easily see; and they are almost perpetually 
voluntarily exposing themselves to the public.41 
 
Yet, one need not be homeless, in order to experience 
diminished privacy under this view of the Fourth Amendment, as even 
the working poor experience obvious differentials in privacy.42 Low-
wage workers and the poor generally enjoy reduced privacy 
expectations because of the structures where they reside or their 
requirement.43 Those living in crowded apartment complexes in close 
proximity to others experience less privacy than others in single-
family detached houses. Similarly, those living in poorly constructed 
structures that do not adequately conceal noises or activities within the 
home also experience a diminished expectation of privacy that could 
ultimately foreclose Fourth Amendment protection. For example, 
several scholars have noted that this conception of the Fourth 
Amendment protects the privacy of only those wealthy enough to 
afford certain tangible privacy enhancements such as a secluded 
neighborhood, a spacious yard, fences, or soundproof walls, for 
example. 44  Because   “privacy   follows   space”   those   who   have   the  
ability to purchase more space, have more privacy.45   
 
Christopher Slobogin has argued that a number of Supreme 
Court  cases  “seriously  undermine  the  Fourth  Amendment  as  applied  to                                                          
41 Id. at 377–88. 
42 See generally Gilman, supra note 3, at 1390 (explaining data collection and 
various privacy invasions of the poor in the realm of low-wage workplace and 
welfare-receipt). 
43 Id. at 1398–99 (detailing numerous ways in which low-wage workers and those on 
public assistance experience invasions of privacy such as having public benefits 
recipients  “fingerprinted,  and  photographed,  usually through biometric imaging.”). 
44 See Ronald J. Bacigal, Some Observations and Proposals on the Nature of the 
Fourth Amendment, 46 GEO. WAS. L. REV. 529, 541–42 (1978) (explaining that the 
Fourth  Amendment’s  privacy  protections  exist  primarily  for  “those  wealthy  enough  
to live  exclusively  in  private  places”);;  Slobogin,  supra note 29, at 401 (noting that 
the  Fourth  Amendment  protection  varies  according  to  whether  one  has  access  to  “a  
freestanding home, fences, lawns, heavy curtains, and vision and sound-proof doors 
and  walls”). 
45 Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1270. 
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poorer   people.”46 Slobogin catalogues a number of Supreme Court 
cases, including those discussing warrantless searches of the homes of 
welfare   recipients,   the   Court’s   “container   jurisprudence”   which   has  
been interpreted to mean that any container outside a building may be 
search without a warrant, as well as cases involving Fourth 
Amendment  seizures,  can  be  construed  to  create  a  “poverty  exception”  
to the Fourth Amendment.47 Slobogin concludes that people who live 
in  public  spaces,  and  “people  who  have  difficulty  hiding  or  distancing 
their living space from casual observers (for instance those who live in 
tenements and other crowded areas) are much more likely to 
experience  unregulated  government  intrusions.”48  
 
Furthermore, even though the home has always received 
elevated treatment under the Fourth Amendment, the Katz reasonable 
expectation of privacy standard allows low-income individuals to 
experience a reduced rate of privacy even within the sanctity of the 
home.49 The poor are often required to divulge information to the state 
in order to obtain government assistance and in 2006, in Sanchez v. 
San Diego, the Court upheld a home visit against a Fourth Amendment 
challenge,   stating   that   “a   person’s   relationship   with   the   state   can  
reduce  that  person’s  expectation  of  privacy,  even  within the sanctity of 
the  home.” 50   
 
Outside the context of the home, there are other areas in which 
the poor have unequal access to privacy rights. One such instance is 
the transportation context. In urban settings, many people walk from 
place to place and the Fourth Amendment is not generous to 
pedestrians.51 In the street, law enforcement officers need not have any 
justification to approach citizens and ask them questions, and this 
conduct falls outside the purview of the Fourth Amendment as long as 
the encounter remains consensual. 52  While cars are afforded less                                                         
46 Slobogin, supra note 29, at 392.  
47 See generally id. at 400–406.  
48 Id. at 401.  
49 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). 
50 Sanchez v. San Diego, 464 F.3d 916, 927 (9th Cir. 2006). See also Wyman v. 
James, 400 U.S. 309, 315–316 (1971). 
51 Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1271. 
52 See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991), 439–440 (finding that brief 
questioning on a bus does not constitute a seizure); California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 
621, 629 (1991) (holding that a police chase of a fleeing suspect was not a seizure 
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privacy than homes, many low-income people, particularly those in 
urban settings, rely on public transportation such as buses and 
subways, and the Fourth Amendment treats passengers in these public 
modes of transportation much like pedestrians.53 
 
As  Stuntz  so  eloquently  noted,  “Fourth  Amendment  law  makes  
wealthier suspects better off than they otherwise would be and may 
make   poorer   suspects   worse   off.” 54  Stuntz goes on to explain that 
while the impact of the lack of privacy protections for the poor and for 
African-Americans is   unknowable,   it   perhaps   “contributed   to   the  
creation of a prison population increasingly dominated by blacks 
punished   for   crack   offenses.” 55  The prominence of the reasonable 
expectation of privacy standard combined with the reality that many 
urban poor live in areas that subject them to a reduced level of privacy 
has prompted much debate about how to ameliorate the class divide 
that has developed over the last several decades.56 What if anything 
can be done to solve this poverty/privacy dilemma? 
 
II. U.S. V. JONES AND ITS (NON) IMPACT ON THE PRIVACY RIGHTS OF 
THE URBAN POOR 
 
A. The Narrow Application of the Physical Trespass Doctrine 
Will Not Augment the Privacy Rights of the Urban Poor 
  
 The  Supreme  Court’s  decision  in  Jones represents a significant 
shift in defining what constitutes a search under the Fourth                                                                                                                                   
within the Fourth Amendment); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984) (finding 
that brief questioning in the absence of physical restraint does not constitute a 
seizure). 
53 Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1271. 
54 Id. at 1266.  
55 Id.  
56 Id.  at  1289  (suggesting  the  “Fourth  Amendment  protects  the  wrong  people  because  
it  protects  the  wrong  interest”  and  noting  that  less  constitutional  protection  for  
everyone, including middle class homeowners could correct the inequity. Stuntz 
intimates that shifting from privacy to freedom from police violence or 
discrimination would be more effective.). See also Carol S. Steiker, How Much 
Justice Can You Afford – A Response to Stuntz, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1290, 1294 
(1999) (arguing that doctrinal changes such as requiring officers to inform suspects 
that they have a right to refuse consent searches and changing the Fourth 
Amendment to offer a remedy for pretextual stops based on race or ethnicity would 
lead to greater equality).  
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Amendment, and this analysis seeks to explore what, if any, impact 
this shift will have on the urban poor. In Jones, the government 
suspected that the defendant was trafficking in drugs. 57  While the 
defendant’s  car  was  parked  in  a  public  parking  lot,  government  agents  
attached  a  GPS  tracking  device  on  the  defendant’s  vehicle  and  tracked  
the  vehicle’s  movements.58 Jones alleged that placing the device on his 
car  and  tracking  the  car’s  movements  violated  his  Fourth  Amendment  
right against illegal search.59 The Jones Court announced a unanimous 
decision determining that attaching the device indeed constituted a 
search. 60  Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia focused on the 
physical trespass of placing the device   on   Jones’   car   and   noted   that,  
“[b]y attaching the device to the Jeep, [the] officer encroached on a 
protected  area.”61   
 
So what is the import of the Jones decision and how does it 
affect privacy rights? It makes clear that the Katz reasonable 
expectation of privacy standard did not abandon the physical trespass 
doctrine, but instead added to it.62 In the Jones opinion, Justice Scalia 
clearly   stated   “the   Katz   reasonable-expectation of privacy test has 
been added to, not substituted for, the common-law  trespassory  test.”63  
The majority opinion in Jones elucidates the independent nature of the 
trespass test and the reasonable expectation of privacy test. 64  The 
Court will first ask whether there was a physical trespass to property.65 
If so, then a search has occurred. 66  If there has been no physical 
trespass, the inquiry then moves to whether the individual had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the property. 67                                                         
57 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 949. 
61 Id. at 952. But see id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (discussing the 
reasonable expectation of privacy  standard  which  “augmented,  but  did  not  displace  
or diminish, the common law trespassory test  that  preceded  it”);;  id. (Alito, J., 
concurring) (arguing the property-based analysis is problematic and that the 
reasonable expectations of privacy standard is the sole determining factor as to 
whether government actions implicate the Fourth Amendment). 
62 Id. at 952. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 950–53. 
65 Id. at 955. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
Simmons   




 Although the Jones opinion does seem to open the door, albeit 
it slightly, for more privacy protections for impoverished individuals 
including the homeless or urban poor, the opinion is hardly a 
revolutionary tool for protecting the privacy rights of the urban poor.  
In fact, as one scholar   noted,   “Jones is unlikely to have significant 
precedential   value”   because   the  majority   opinion   only   reiterates   that  
physical trespass implicates the Fourth Amendment, which is not a 
novel concept.68  
 
Since Jones relies on the physical trespass theory, it is only 
applicable in a narrow set of circumstances. Ironically, the government 
is  not  necessarily  required  to  physically  trespass  on  one’s  property,  as  
they did in Jones, to monitor them using GPS or other electronic 
modes of surveillance. As Justice Sotomayor explained in her 
concurring opinion in Jones, “in   cases   of   electronic   or   other   novel  
modes of surveillance that do not depend upon physical invasion of 
property,”  the  Katz analysis is still determinative.69  Furthermore, even 
though the reinvigoration of the physical trespass doctrine may, in the 
view of some, have the overall effect of strengthening Fourth 
Amendment protections, this can hardly be true for the urban poor.  
This is primarily so because of the ways in which urban street crimes 
are investigated do not rely on physical trespass in the first place, and 
searches  of  an  individual’s  person  can  be  justified  on  other  grounds.70  
 
B. Aggressive Policing Tactics Disproportionately Impact the 
Privacy Rights of the Urban Poor  
 
The Jones opinion very well may represent an augmentation of 
privacy rights in general. At the very least, the decision does remind us 
that there are indeed two separate inquiries to determine whether the 
government has invaded these rights (has there been a trespass, or 
alternatively, has there been a violation of a reasonable expectation of 
                                                        
68 Thomas K. Clancy, United States v. Jones: Fourth Amendment Applicability in the 
21st Century, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 303, 303 (2012). 
69 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955. 
70 Stuntz, supra note 2, at  1271  (“Police  can  approach  anyone  and  ask  questions  with  
no justification at all; as long as the encounter is no more coercive than any police-
citizen  encounter  must  be….”). 
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privacy). 71  Nevertheless, Jones is not the antidote for the serious 
affliction that the lack of Fourth Amendment protection visits upon the 
urban poor. The aggressive and sometimes violent manner in which 
law enforcement officers investigate crimes in these communities 
represents the largest barrier to Fourth Amendment protection. The 
physical trespass at issue in Jones (a GPS device unknowingly placed 
on his car) pales in comparison to the face-to-face law enforcement 
interactions that many residents of poor, urban neighborhoods face on 
a daily basis.  
 
One recent example of a law-enforcement strategy that is 
employed almost exclusively against the urban poor or minorities is 
“Stop   and   Frisk.”  This   practice,   as   it   has   been   implemented   in  New  
York City, has long been controversial. Pursuant to this policy, 
officers stop individuals on the street and search them for weapons. 
There is a wealth of statistical information to support the notion that 
the New York City Police Department has implemented Stop and 
Frisk in a racially discriminatory manner.72  
 
In Floyd v. United States, plaintiffs filed a class action suit 
arguing that stop and frisk is implemented in an unconstitutional 
manner.73 According to findings in the case, between January 2004 
and June 2012, the NYPD made 4.4 million stops. Over 80% of those 
stopped were African-American or Latino.74 The Court also found that 
the racial composition of a precinct or census tract predicts the stop 
rate above and beyond the crime rate.75  
 
From 2004 through 2009, when any law enforcement action 
was taken following a stop, African-Americans were 30% more likely 
to be arrested (as opposed to receiving a summons) than Whites, for 
the same suspected crime. From 2004 through 2009, African-
Americans who were stopped were about 14% more likely – and 
Latinos 9% more likely – than Whites to be subjected to the use of                                                         
71 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955. 
72 See Matthew Bloch, Ford Fessenden & Janet Roberts, Stop, Question and Frisk in 
New York Neighborhoods, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/07/11/nyregion/20100711-stop-and-
frisk.html?ref=nyregion&_r=0. 
73 Floyd v. New York, 283 F.R.D. 153, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 168. 
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force. In 2009 alone, African-Americans and Latinos represented 84% 
of the people stopped, although African-Americans only comprise 
26% of the population of New York City and Latinos only 27%.76 The 
New York Civil Liberties Union also reports similar racial disparities.  
In 2012, the New York Civil Liberties Union reported that of those 
stopped, 55% were African-American, 32% were Latino, and 10% 
were White.77 Grassroots organizations and class action lawsuits have 
brought increased attention to the practice, and recently elected Mayor 
Bill de Blasio has vowed to end the practice.78 
 
Several independent commissions examining police behavior 
have   found   that   an   “unnecessarily   aggressive”   policing   style   exists  
within many police departments, which unsurprisingly lead to tension 
and sometimes to violent contacts between police and citizens.79  
 
The Mollen Commission’s  investigation  of  the  New  York  City  
Police Department in the early 1990s, revealed that while most 
officers disapproved of police brutality, many officers willingly 
tolerated violence toward suspects. 80  In the late 1990s, New York 
City’s  quality  of life policing initiatives, which encouraged custodial 
arrests for misdemeanor offenses, resulted in increased citizen 
complaints against the police.81                                                         
76 NYPD Stop-and-Frisk Statistics, CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, 
http://ccrjustice.org/files/CCR-Stop-and-Frisk-Fact-Sheet-2010.pdf (last visited Oct. 
7, 2014).  
77 Stop-and-Frisk Data, N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, 
http://www.nyclu.org/content/stop-and-frisk-data (last visited Sept. 25, 2014). 
78 See Stop-And-Frisk-Appeal Dropped By Mayor Bill de Blasio, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/30/stop-and-frisk-appeal-
dropped-mayor-de-blasio_n_4695930.html (discussing lawsuits regarding New 
York’s  stop  and  frisk policy and explaining that de  Blasio  “made  settling  the  stop-
and-frisk  issue  a  major  component  of  his  campaign”). 
79 Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 453, 495 (2004); See also id. at 495–501 (detailing findings of the 
Christopher Commission, the Kolts Commission, and the Mollen Commission, all of 
which indicated that police brutality is a systemic problem). 
80 CITY OF N.Y. COMM’N TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION 
AND THE ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEP’T, COMMISSION 
REPORT 49 (1994) (“As  important  as  the  possible  extent  of  brutality,  is  the  extent  of  
brutality  tolerance  we  found  throughout  the  department.”). 
81 Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence 
Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance 
Policing New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291, 378 (1998) (noting the sharp 
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The Christopher Commission, which examined the policies and 
practices of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) in the wake 
of  the  Rodney  King  beating,  reported  that  the  LAPD  rewarded  “hard-
nosed”   tactics,   and   focused   on   crime   control   rather   than   crime  
prevention.82 The LAPD also implemented a flawed evaluation system 
that evaluated officers based used statistical measures including the 
number of arrests made and the number of calls to which they 
responded.83 Simultaneously, the LAPD trained officers to engage in 
aggressive crime prevention techniques that resulted in a high rate of 
street encounters.84 The Christopher Commission concluded that the 
combination   of   these   strategies   resulted   in   a   “siege   (‘we/they’)  
mentality”  between  officers  and  citizens.85 
 
These aggressive tactics are typically reserved for traditionally 
disadvantaged or marginalized members of society, and there is an 
overwhelming consensus that minorities experience a greater rate of 
police brutality and misconduct. 86  As I. Bennett Capers explains,                                                                                                                                   
increase in citizen complaints against the police upon the initiation of order 
maintenance policing).  
82 INDEP. COMM’N ON THE L.A. POLICE DEP’T, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT 
COMMISSION OF THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT XIV (1991) (“Witness  after  
witness testified to unnecessarily aggressive confrontations between LAPD officers 
and citizens, particularly  members  of  minority  communities.”). 
83 Id.  
84 Id.  
85 Id. 
86 See, e.g., CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR. ET AL., CRIMINAL JUSTICE INST. AT HARVARD 
LAW SCHOOL FOR THE NAT’L ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, 
BEYOND THE RODNEY KING STORY: AN INVESTIGATION OF POLICE CONDUCT IN 
MINORITY COMMUNITIES 293 (1995) (explaining how racism contributes to the way 
in which  police  “perform  their  law  enforcement  functions”); RONALD WEITZER & 
STEVEN A. TUCH, RACE AND POLICING IN AMERICA: CONFLICT AND REFORM 71 
(2006); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE: POLICE BRUTALITY AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (1998) [hereinafter Shielded from 
Justice], available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/u/us/uspol986.pdf  (“Race  
continues  to  play  a  central  role  in  police  brutality  in  the  United  States.”);;  Craig  B.  
Futterman et al., The Use of Statistical Evidence to Address Police Supervisory and 
Disciplinary  Practices:  The  Chicago  Police  Department’s  Broken  System, 1 DEPAUL 
J. FOR SOC. JUST. 251, 267–68, 289–91 (2008) (detailing particular events and 
patterns of police brutality and misconduct and how it disproportionately impacts 
minorities); Clifford L. Broman et al., The Experience and Consequences of 
Perceived Racial Discrimination: A Study of African Americans, 26 J. BLACK 
PSYCHOL. 165, 175–76 (2000) (detailing the impact of perceived discrimination on 
African Americans as a people); Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 
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“police  are  more  likely  to  engage  in  force  when  dealing  with  members  
of outgroups (those who are poor or minority or gender non-
conforming)   than   when   dealing   with   members   of   ingroups.” 87  For 
example, in a 1998 report, Human Rights Watch examined police 
departments   in   14   major   United   States   cities   and   found   that   “race  
continues to play a central role in police brutality in the United 
States.”88 In a 1996 Bureau of Justice Statistics report, data showed 
that while African-American and Hispanics represented only 20% of 
the population, they made up half of the documented cases of police 
brutality across the country.89 Similarly, a 1996 Amnesty International 
Report reviewing police misconduct in New York City found that 
nearly all of the victims who died while in police custody were racial 
minorities.90 
 
C. The Privacy/Poverty Dilemma Causes Tangible and 
Intangible Harms to Affected Communities  
 
Racial minorities, such as African-Americans and Latinos, are 
disproportionately represented in the poor urban communities that are 
the focus of this Article. 91  The racial and class distinctions are 
                                                                                                                                  
51 VAND. L. REV. 333, 388–89 (1998) (explaining that police brutality and 
misconduct remains a problem for minorities). 
87 I. Bennet Capers, Crime, Surveillance, and Communities, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
959, 982 (2013); see also, id. at 982, n.135 (statistical  data  shows  “significant  
disparities in the use of deadly force based on the race of the shooting victim/subject 
and that virtually all of this disparity occurs as a result of the Memphis policy that 
allows  officers  to  exercise  their  discretion  to  shoot  fleeing  property  crime  suspects.”  
(citing Brief for Appellee–Respondent at 23–26, Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 
(1985) (Nos. 83–1035, 83–1070))). 
88 SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE, supra note 86. 
89 Roberto Suro, Study Says Cops Used Force v. 500,000, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, 
Nov. 24, 1997, at 21. 
90 AMNESTY INT’L, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: POLICE BRUTALITY AND 




91 See Jane W. Gibson-Carpenter & James E. Carpenter, Race, Poverty, and Justice: 
Looking Where the Streetlight Shines, 3 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 99, 99 (1994). 
Simmons   
2014]   FUTURE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 259 
 
 
inherently intertwined. Thus, it is not surprising that racial minorities 
tend to distrust law enforcement officials.92  
 
This unfair targeting and mistreatment of the urban poor and 
minorities and the perceptions of bias reduce the legitimacy of law 
enforcement in these communities. Reduced legitimacy in these 
communities causes other harms, or at least prevents the community 
from experiencing the benefits of legitimacy.93 It is well established 
that individuals are more likely to comply with the law and cooperate 
in police investigations if they believe that their law enforcement 
institutions are legitimate.94 
  
D. The Harms of a Failing Fourth Amendment 
 
There is no doubt that as a society, we are all subject to 
government surveillance. When walking through any major city street 
in the United States, street cameras capture the likenesses of millions 
of residents, and many jurisdictions have the capability to aggregate 
data from multiple locations and to share information among various 
agencies.95 Many metropolitan areas have thousands of cameras that 
allow police to monitor citizen activities on public streets. 96  Such 
surveillance has been deemed constitutional under the Katz reasonable 
expectation of privacy standard and would undoubtedly meet the 
                                                        
92 See I. Bennet Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, 83 IND. L.J. 835, 877–78 
(2008) (explaining that people  in  poor  and  minority  communities  “distrust  the  police  
and  question  the  fairness  of  the  criminal  justice  system”). 
93 See generally id. at 837 (detailing a study done by scholar Tom Tyler which 
showed that the perceived legitimacy of law enforcement influences compliance). 
See also Tom R. Tyler & Jeffery Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why do 
People Help the Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
231,  267  (2008)  (“Cooperation  increases  not  only  when  the  public  views  the  police 
as effective in controlling crime and maintaining social order, but also when citizens 
see  the  police  as  legitimate  authorities  who  are  entitled  to  be  obeyed.”). 
94 See generally id.  
95 See Capers, supra note 87, at 960–63 (describing the use of surveillance systems 
in major metropolitan areas and even small towns).  
96 For example, in 2006 New York had almost 4,200 public and private surveillance 
cameras, and in 2009, Washington D.C. was estimated to have more than 5,200 
cameras owned by city agencies. Id. at 961–62. 
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physical trespass standard recently reinvigorated in the Jones 
decision.97 
 
Despite the fact that many Americans are subject to 
surveillance and suffer some unknown deprivations of privacy, it is 
also   true  however,   that   “police  undoubtedly   are   fixated  on   the  urban  
poor.”98 Ironically, however, police may be reserving less intrusive 
forms of surveillance, such as cameras, for more affluent 
neighborhoods while reserving more intrusive interactions, such as 
stop and frisk initiatives, for the urban poor. For example, in New 
York,  cameras  “appear  least  where they are desired most: in some of 
the  city’s  most  crime-ridden neighborhoods, among residents of public 
housing who have been experiencing mounting violence and all of its 
attendant  psychological  disruption.”99  
 
There is a wealth of research and commentary devoted to 
determining why police officers reserve aggressive tactics for poor 
communities. Scholars have posited that perhaps the framers of the 
Constitution were concerned only with protecting middle-class values 
(although it is difficult to imagine that they could have envisioned the 
structural and cultural landscape that contributes to the class divide in 
privacy law).100  
 
One possible explanation for the inequity is that it is easier and 
less costly for police to investigate low-level drug crimes in inner-city 
neighborhoods than to investigate these offenses in other markets.101 
Others offer the more disconcerting view that   “a   court interested in 
crime control might want Fourth Amendment rules that make it 
relatively easy to search and seize the class of people most likely to 
commit crime – the   poor.”102 Of course, the premise that the poor                                                         
97 See United  States  v.  Knotts,  460  U.S.  276,  281  (1983)  (“A  person  traveling  in  an  
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
movements  from  one  place  to  another.”);;  see also, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945; Katz, 389 
U.S. 347. 
98 Slobogin, supra note 29, at 408. 
99 Capers, supra note 87, at 989, n.178 (quoting Gina Bellafante, The  Watchmen’s  
Misdirected Gaze, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2012, at B1).  
100 Slobogin, supra note 29, at 406. 
101 See Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1282 (noting  that  it  is  “cheap”  for  law  enforcement  to  
police street markets). 
102 Slobogin, supra note 29, at 406. 
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commit more crime is spurious, given that the poor are 
disproportionately targeted by law enforcement.103 Overt racism and 
implicit stereotyping on the part of police officers, exacerbated by the 
lack of political power poor urban residents wield, also presents a 
plausible explanation for the continued use of aggressive law 
enforcement strategies.104 Aggressive tactics such as raids, sweeps and 
stop and frisks frequently occur in areas already experiencing 
concentrated poverty.105  
 
In addition to determining the causes of the divide, it is also 
important to explore the resulting harms of this class divide regarding 
privacy rights. Generally, in the privacy context, if the government 
infringes  upon  one’s  privacy  there  may  be  a  serious  question  as  to  the  
relative harm such an infringement imposes.106 For many Americans, 
the additional surveillance or advances in technology, while arguably 
diminishing their privacy, may have no appreciable effect on their 
daily lives. For example, it is difficult to discern whether and to what 
extent one experiences harm if the government tracks the whereabouts                                                         
103 See Gibson-Carpenter & Carpenter, supra note 91, at 100–01 (arguing that the 
common notion that the poor commit disproportionately more crime in the United 
States  is  flawed  because  of  the  community’s  and  the  police’s  “focus  on  street  crimes  
[which] hides suite crimes and diverts our attention from such laws which protect the 
harms, many of which are indeed violent, committed by those with wealth and 
power”).   
104 See Liyah Kaprice Brown, Officer or Overseer?: Why Police Desegregation Fails 
as an Adequate Solution to Racist, Oppressive, and Violent Policing in Black 
Communities, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 757, 761–62  (2005)  (“Police  
racism and misconduct frequently are attributed to the over-enforcement of laws in 
Black  communities,”  which  “gives  rise  to  an  adversarial  model  of  policing  in  which  
racial profiling, pretextual stops, unlawful searches and arrests, botched raids, 
excessive force, murder,  and  corruption  abound.”);;  see also Dorothy E. Roberts, 
Foreword: Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of Order-Maintenance 
Policing, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775, 835–36 (1999) (arguing that 
aggressive policing tactics, such as order-maintenance policing,  “reinforces  
stereotypes that portray Blacks as lawless and legitimate police harassment in Black 
communities”). 
105 Andrew E. Taslitz, Respect and the Fourth Amendment, 94 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 15, 56–57 (2003) (arguing that unfair treatment in the criminal justice 
system, like overly-aggressive  policing  tactics,  falls  “largely  on  the  poor,  the  
minorities, and the disenfranchised, ensuring continued public support for crime 
control  measures”). 
106 See Laurent Sacharoff, The Relational Nature of Privacy, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 1249, 1275–80  (2012)  (discussing  the  “harms”  associated  with  governmental  
intrusion of privacy). 
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of their vehicle but never uses the information. 107  The harms 
associated with reduced privacy rights for residents of inner-city 
impoverished areas are readily discernible because they are 
implemented in a more intrusive manner.108 Furthermore, when bias is 
infused into this inquiry, the harm of that bias itself has its own 
implications.109   
 
This loss of trust and refusal to cooperate with police has 
dangerous implications for communities, especially those communities 
that could benefit from partnerships between citizens and police to 
prevent and investigate crime.110 As Bret Asbury notes,  
 
“[c]itizens are more disposed to cooperate with police 
when institutions enjoy a high level of legitimacy. The 
perceived legitimacy of an institution, it has been 
shown, depends largely on whether citizens perceive 
that they are receiving fair and respectful treatment by 
police and other decision makers. In effect, citizens 
reciprocate respectful treatment with cooperation and 
                                                        
107 See Steve Vladeck, The Clapper Fix: Congress and Standing to Challenge Secret 
Surveillance, LAWFARE (June 20, 2013, 12:48 PM), 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/06/the-clapper-fix-congress-and-standing-to-
challenge-secret-surveillance/ (discussing the inherent issues in the Clapper v. 
Amnesty International holding,  that  plaintiffs  lack  standing  if  they  cannot  “prove  that  
interception  of  their  communications  under  section  702  [is]  ‘certainly  impending,’  
and  therefore  [can]  not  satisfy  the    ‘injury-in-fact’  prong  of  the  Supreme  Court’s  test  
for  Article  III  standing”); see also Liz Clark Rinehart, Clapper v. Amnesty 
International USA: Allowing the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 to Turn 
“Incidentally”  Into  “Certainly,” 73 MD. L. REV. 1018, 1039 (2014) (arguing the 
inherent  “catch-22”  in  the  Supreme  Court’s  standing  requirement  for  plaintiffs,  in  
that  plaintiffs  “must  show  they  have  been  or will certainly be the targets of 
surveillance,”  but  “will  be  unable  to  show  the  requisite  actual  injury  since  they  will  
be unable [to] show specific knowledge  of  the  surveillance…if they are not 
permitted  discovery,”  due  to  the  government’s  ability  to  invoke the state secrets 
doctrine). 
108 Stuntz, supra note  2,  at  1285  (“Street  stops  and  sweeps  can  be  very  intrusive  
indeed, but the privacy intrusion is not as great as in house searches….”). 
109 Id.  (discussing  the  “racial  tilt”  associated  with  Fourth  Amendment privacy rights). 
110 See Capers, supra note 92, at 842 (explaining that perceived illegitimacy of law 
enforcement leads to a lack of compliance and increased crime). 
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obedience and disrespectful treatment with 
resistance….”111  
 
Furthermore,  “[c]orruption  and  brutality  undermine   the   legitimacy of 
governmental authority and reduce the willingness of citizens to 
comply with the law. Left unchecked, police misconduct often triggers 
racial  tension  because  “[p]oor  people  of  color  bear  the  brunt  of  police 
abuse.”112 The failure to create these partnerships because of violent 
encounters ironically may result in perpetuating more crime within 
these vulnerable communities. 
 
Whatever the cause of this fixation on the urban poor or the 
tangible or intangible harms that result from this fixation, it is 
inconsistent with our  notions  of  liberty  and  democracy  that  a  person’s  
economic status should determine the extent of her constitutional 
rights.  
 
III. THE URBAN POOR AND THE ELUSIVE PROTECTIONS OF THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT 
 
Communities are increasingly becoming distrustful of law-
enforcement and civil unrest in poor urban neighborhoods often stems 
from negative interactions between citizens and police.113 Thus, the 
tangible and intangible harms resulting from the class divide in 
privacy protections under the Fourth Amendment require immediate 
solutions.  
 
Unfortunately, the Fourth Amendment standards articulated by 
the Supreme Court have allowed these aggressive policing tactics to 
go unchecked, and therefore may be partially to blame for the growing 
sense of discontent in many of these communities. In addition to the 
fact that the Katz analysis is still likely to apply to activities of the                                                         
111 Dan M. Kahan, Reciprocity, Collective Action, and Community Policing, 90 CAL. 
L. REV. 1513, 1525 (2002).  
112 Stephen Clarke, Arrested Oversight: A Comparative Analysis and Case Study of 
How Civilian Oversight of the Police Should Function and How it Fails, 43 COLUM. 
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 2 (2009); see also Richard R. Johnson, Citizen Expectations of 
Police Traffic Stop Behavior, 27 POLICING: AN INT’L J. OF POLICE STRATEGIES  & 
MGMT. 487, 488 (2004) (noting that studies have shown that people are more likely 
to  “defer  to  the  law  and  refrain  from  illegal  behavior”  when  police treat them fairly).  
113 See Capers, supra note 92, at 877–78. 
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urban poor, embedded within Fourth Amendment jurisprudence are 
other fundamental impediments to robust Fourth Amendment rights 
for this frequently marginalized group. 
  
A. Lax Constitutional Standards Permit Reduced Fourth 
Amendment Protections 
  
First, Terry v. Ohio, one of the most important criminal 
procedure cases of the twentieth century, allowed police officers to 
stop suspects on less than probable cause.114  The  Court’s  opinion   in  
Terry allowed officers to perform a pat-down   of   a   suspect’s   outer  
clothing if the officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion that the 
suspect was armed.115 This was the first time the Court had approved a 
search of a person based on a standard less than probable cause.116 The 
Court mused that if the standard for such searches remained too high, 
officers would nevertheless conduct such searches, resulting in the 
dilution of the probable cause standard.117 
 
Second,   the  Court’s  current jurisprudence offers no protection 
against pre-textual stop.118 The   Court’s   decision   in   Whren approved 
pre-textual stops, which allows law enforcement officers to stop 
individuals if they have reasonable suspicion or probable cause for one 
violation, even if the underlying reason for a stop was based on a 
suspected violation for which the officer did not have reasonable 
articulable suspicion to justify a stop. 119  Experts have fiercely 
criticized the Whren decision as an open invitation for police officers 
to abuse their discretion and stop citizens in an arbitrary and 
discriminatory fashion.120                                                         
114 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). 
115 Id. at 26–27. 
116 Id.  at  21  (setting  forth  the  standard  of  reasonable  suspicion  where  an  “officer  
must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with 
rational inferences  from  those  facts,  reasonably  warrant  that  intrusion”). 
117 Id. at  14  (explaining  that  the  exclusionary  rule  “is  powerless  to  deter  invasions  of  
constitutionally guaranteed rights where the police either have no interest in 
prosecuting or are willing to forgo successful prosecution in the interest of serving 
some  other  goal”). 
118 Whren, 517 U.S. at 812–13. 
119 Id. 
120 Jennifer R. Walters, United States v. Whren: The U.S. Supreme Court Determines 
the Constitutional Reasonableness of Pretextual Traffic Stops and Tips the Scales in 
Favor of Law Enforcement, 19 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 247, 275–76  (1997)  (“police 
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Lax constitutional standards have allowed over-policing and 
aggressive police tactics to go unchecked.121 Perhaps these practices 
would have failed to flourish if stricter constitutional standards 
prohibited them. Heightened constitutional standards, such as 
prohibiting pre-textual stops and requiring officers to have more than 
mere reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, would strengthen the 
Fourth Amendment rights for the urban poor. Thus, protecting the 
Fourth Amendment rights for residents of inner-city neighborhoods 
will necessarily include fundamental changes in the doctrine that are 
not forthcoming. A lack of stricter constitutional standards has 
tolerated, if not blatantly encouraged, the use of aggressive police 
tactics in many communities.122 Put simply, poor urban communities 
are policed in a completely different manner than wealthy 
communities. 123  Wealthy communities may be policed by private                                                                                                                                   
are essentially given unfettered discretion in making traffic stops to test their 
suspicions,  thereby  subjecting  motorists  to  arbitrary  traffic  stops,”  a  power  that  “has  
been used disproportionately against African-Americans and Hispanics, due to 
police  readiness  to  view  minorities  in  general  as  potential  offenders.”);;  see also 
Craig M. Glantz, “Could”  This  Be  the  End  of  Fourth  Amendment  Protections  for  
Motorists?, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 864, 864 (1997) (asserting that the 
Whren Court’s  “purely  objective  approach  to  police  traffic  stops…actually facilitates 
arbitrary  searches  and  seizures…[and] protects the use of impermissible bases by 
police officers  to  effect  traffic  stops….”);; David O. Markus, Whren v. United States: 
A Pretext to Subvert the Fourth Amendment, 14 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 91, 97 
(1998)  (arguing  that  “[w]here  an  officer  is  using  a  traffic  violation  as  a  pretext  for  
pulling one over for drugs, gender, or race, that unconstitutional reason is the 
motivation  behind  the  stop,”  and  due  to  the  prevalence  of  minor  offenses,  every  man  
is  subject  to  the  whims  of  every  officer,  which  is  “precisely  the  kind  of  arbitrary  
authority which gave rise to  the  Fourth  Amendment.”). 
121 See Walters, supra note 120, at 275–76  (“Conversely,  some  police  officers  
believe it is their responsibility to enforce all laws and the Whren decision merely 
gives  them  discretion  to  do  so.”). 
122 Id. at 277 (explaining that because  of  lax  constitutional  standards,  “the  intrusion  
into the privacy of ordinary citizens will increase by aggressive police tactics 
targeted  at  identifying  criminals….”). 
123 David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1820 
(2005) (“‘The  rich  will  be  increasingly  policed  preventatively  by  commercial  
security while the poor will be policed reactively by enforcement-oriented public 
police,’  with  both  the  private  and  public  sector  working  to  ‘protect  the  affluent  from  
the poor – the one by barricading and excluding, the other by repressing and 
imprisoning.’”  (quoting  David  H.  Bayley  &  Clifford  D.  Shearing,  The Future of 
Policing, 30 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 585, 594, 602 (1996))); Taslitz, supra note 105, at 
56 (“Consent  searches  and  quality  of  life policing are used disproportionately against 
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security forces to   “protect”   them   while   law   enforcement   officers  
employ reactionary tactics in poor communities.124 Practices such as 
stop and frisk are used to investigate and deter crime in certain areas, 
and would not be tolerated in communities with the political capital to 
stop these policies.125 This differential treatment is not accidental and 
“[p]olice   are   exquisitely   sensitive   to   political   considerations   and  
understand that the use of aggressive tactics in middle class White 
neighborhoods would evoke widespread outrage.”126 
 
Thus, as a whole, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has gaping 
holes that allow officers unfettered discretion with the possibility of 
abuse. These policies disproportionately impact individuals, often 
urban-dwelling members of minority groups with lower 
socioeconomic status. While Jones’  focus  on  physical  trespass  may  be  
seen as a positive development in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, it 
is hardly the antidote for inequalities that exist in privacy distribution. 
 
IV. REFOCUSING THE DEBATE FROM PRIVACY TO POLICING 
 
A. Possible Solutions to the Privacy/Poverty Dilemma 
 
Jones’  emphasis  on  physical  trespass  will  not  remedy  the  fatal  
flaws in current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Thus, those                                                                                                                                   
African  Americans.”); Gibson-Carpenter & Carpenter, supra note 91, at 101 
(explaining  that  “[i]nner-city schools are more likely than those in wealthier areas to 
call  upon  police”  for  a  formal  handling  when  children get in trouble, whereas 
children from wealthier areas are more likely to be referred to their parents). 
124 Sklansky, supra note 123, at 1820.  
125 See David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor 
Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 687 (1994) (arguing  that  “stop  and  
frisk”  tactics  have  a  “disproportionate  impact  on  the  poor,  and  on  racial  and  ethnic  
minorities.”).  In  fact,  it  was  political  activism  and  widespread  and  prolonged  protest  
in New York City that has been credited with efforts to halt stop and frisk as it was 
practiced in New York. Carol S. Steiker, Terry Unbound, 82 MISS. L.J. 329, 330 
(2013) (discussing the class action filed by the Center for Constitutional Rights 
against  the  City  of  New  York  in  1999  “alleging unconstitutional racial profiling in 
the  Department’s  stop-and-frisk  program,”  which  resulted  in  a  consent  decree  four  
years  later  “to  implement  a  number  of  remedial  measures  intended  to  reduce  racial  
disparities  in  stops  and  frisks”).  The  city  has  had ongoing lawsuits and protests, one 
of those protests occurring in the summer of 2012, where thousands of people 
marched  to  end  the  “stop-and-frisk”  policies  of  the  New  York  Police  Department.  Id. 
at 329. 
126 Taslitz, supra note 105, at 56. 
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seeking to reform this flaw in the criminal justice system should 
refocus the debate about privacy and poverty under the Fourth 
Amendment to other legislative efforts to ensure greater equality for 
members of poor urban communities.  
 
First, the federal government and local communities should 
implement rules that require police departments to keep detailed and 
accurate records regarding who is stopped and for what reasons. It is 
notoriously difficult to provide the requisite proof to substantiate a 
racial profiling claim.127 However, recordkeeping is the first step in 
transparency, and knowing that they will be held accountable for those 
they  stop  may  deter  police  officers  from  violating  citizens’  rights.       
 
Representative John Conyers and others in Congress have 
repeatedly tried to pass federal legislation that would address racial 
profiling. Conyers first proposed the Traffic Stops Statistics Act in 
1997, but efforts to pass this legislation failed. 128  Then in 2001, 
Conyers introduced a more comprehensive End Racial Profiling Act of 
2001.129 Despite bi-partisan support, this Act also failed to pass but 
was reintroduced in 2004, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2013.130 
The End Racial Profiling Act would prohibit and attempt to eliminate 
racial profiling by federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement 
agencies and would allow the federal government or private plaintiffs 
to sue for declaratory or injunctive relief. 131  Furthermore, the law                                                         
127 J. Michael McGuinness, State and Federal Standards Require Proof of 
Discriminatory Intent in Ethnic Profiling Claims, 75 N.Y. ST. B.J. 29,  
33  (2003)  (“Ethnic  Profiling  claims  are  generally  difficult  to  establish  because  of  the  
ill-defined intent-based discrimination standard.”). 
128 See Traffic Stops Statistics Act of 1997, H.R. 118, 105th Cong. (1997) (requiring 
data to be collected during all traffic stops for trend analysis); see also Traffic Stops 
Statistics Study Act of 1999, S. 821, 106th Cong. (1999) (requiring the Attorney 
General to collect data of traffic stops by law enforcement officers for subsequent 
trend analysis). 
129 See End Racial Profiling Act of 2001, H.R. 2074, 107th Cong. (2001) (expanding 
the aim of Congressman Conyers’ proposed legislation). 
130 End Racial Profiling Act of 2004, H.R. 3847, 108th Cong. (2004); End Racial 
Profiling Act of 2005, S. 2138, 109th Cong. (2005); End Racial Profiling Act of 
2007, H.R. 4611, 110th Cong. (2007); End Racial Profiling Act of 2010, H.R. 5748, 
111th Cong. (2010); End Racial Profiling Act of 2011, H.R. 3618, 112th Cong. 
(2011); End Racial Profiling Act of 2013, H.R. 2851 113th Cong. (2013).   
131 See End Racial Profiling Act of 2010, H.R. 5748, 112th Cong. (2010) (refining a 
definition of racial profiling). The proposed legislation states:  
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would   authorize   the  United  States  Department   of   Justice   (“DOJ”)   to  
provide   grants   for   “the   development   and   implementation   of   best  
policing practices, such as, early warning tracking systems, technology 
integration, and other management protocols that discourage 
profiling.”132 
 
Many civil right groups, including the National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People and the American Civil Liberties 
Union, have supported the passage of this legislation that would 
specifically prohibit racial profiling, yet Congress has repeatedly 
failed to pass the End Racial Profiling Act. 133 Despite the failure to 
pass such legislation at the federal level, many states have passed their 
own legislation aimed at addressing racial profiling.134 More than half 
of  the  nation’s  states  have  enacted  legislation  either  prohibiting racial 
profiling or requiring jurisdictions within the state to collect data on 
law enforcement stops and searches. 135  Several states that do not 
statutorily prohibit racial profiling have voluntarily agreed to collect 
information related to race and criminal stops.136 Efforts to pass state 
and local legislation requiring police departments to collect and 
analyze data should continue.                                                                                                                                    
 
[T]he practice of a law enforcement agent or agency relying, to any 
degree, on race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion in selecting 
which individual to subject to routine or spontaneous investigatory 
activities or in deciding upon the scope and substance of law 
enforcement activity following the initial investigatory procedure, 
except when there is trustworthy information, relevant to the 
locality and timeframe, that links a person of a particular race, 
ethnicity, national origin, or religion to an identified criminal 
incident or scheme. Id.  
132 156 CONG. REC. E1341–02 (daily ed. Jul. 15, 2010) (Statement of Rep. John 
Conyers).  
133 Press Release, ACLU, Forum Calls on Congress and Administration to End 
Racial Profiling: ACLU Hosts Event to Stop Discrimination (Oct. 27, 2011), 
available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/three_faces_merged_document.pdf; 
Press Release, NAACP, NAACP-Supported End Racial Profiling Act Introduced in 
the U.S. Senate (Oct. 6, 2011), available at http://www.naacp.org/action-
alerts/entry/naacp-supported-end-racial-profiling-act-introduced-in-the-u.s.-senate.  
134 Legislation and Litigation, DATA COLLECTION RESOURCE CTR. AT 
NORTHEASTERN UNIV., http://www.racialprofilinganalysis.neu.edu/ (accessed 
through archive-edu.com) (last visited Oct. 15, 2014) (describing legislation passed 
by different states to end racial profiling). 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
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Second, communities should focus on redistributing police 
resources to areas where they are most needed, but with a focus on 
creating police-citizen partnerships. Redistribution of resources means 
redistribution not only of monetary resources, but redistributing 
personnel from over-policed areas and investigating serious violent 
crimes rather than drug offenses.  
 
Alongside this redistribution should come increased funding 
for specialized training that will ensure that police officers are better 
equipped to address crime in underserved communities. Every year, 
the COPS (Community Oriented Policing) program distributes 
millions of dollars to local communities.137 This funding could be used 
to incentivize local communities not only to strengthen community 
partnerships – which it does – but programs could be developed to 
allow residents of underserved communities greater autonomy in 
setting priorities for their law-enforcement needs. 138  Communities 
might witness changes in how their communities are policed, perhaps 
with police departments shifting from drug enforcement to focusing 
primarily on preventing and investigating violent offenses. 
 
Third, there should be greater regulation of police tactics and 
stricter accountability mechanisms in place for police officers. The 
federal  government’s  “pattern  or  practice”  authority offers one model 
for infusing greater equality into the criminal justice system. 139  In 
1994, Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 14141, a statute that seeks to 
address the policies and practices of a police agency, and has shown 
great promise in spurring institutional reforms in several local law 
enforcement agencies.140 Pursuant  to  its  “pattern  or  practice”  authority  
under 42 U.S.C. § 14141, the DOJ has required several police 
departments nationwide, including the Los Angeles Police Department                                                         
137 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COPS OFFICE FY2014 APPLICATION GUIDE: COMMUNITY 
POLICING DEVELOPMENT (CPD) 1 (2014), available at 
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/2014AwardDocs/CPD/2014-CPD-AppGuide26.pdf. 
138 Id. at 2.  
139 Addressing Police Misconduct Laws Enforced by the Department of Justice, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/polmis.php (last 
visited Oct. 23, 2014). 
140 See 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2006) (authorizing the Attorney General to conduct 
investigations  and,  if  warranted,  file  civil  litigation  to  eliminate  a  “pattern  or  practice  
of conduct by law  enforcement  officers…that deprives persons of rights, privileges, 
or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United 
States”). 
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and the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department, to 
reform their policies and practices.141 Section 14141 grants the federal 
government the authority to sue for injunctive relief to change policies 
within a local police department where DOJ has found a pattern or 
practice of constitutional violations.142  
 
Generally, the resulting consent decrees or agreements have 
included reforms of both substantive and procedural policies to create 
more transparency and ensure accountability.143 One reform includes 
modifying use of force policies to provide guidelines regarding what 
type of force is appropriate in apprehending a suspect and defining or 
limiting circumstances when certain uses of force are appropriate.144                                                          
141 Press  Release,  U.S.  Dep’t  of  Justice,  Justice  Department  Reaches  Agreement  to  
Resolve Police Misconduct Case Against Columbus Police Department (Sept. 4, 
2002), http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2002/September/02_crt_503.htm 
(“Today’s  agreement  is  the  eighth  settlement  under  the  1994  Crime  Bill.”).  “Other  
settlements entered during the Bush Administration include the Cincinnati Police 
Department, the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department and the 
Highland  Park,  Illinois  Police  Department.”    Id.  Additionally,  “[t]he  Justice  
Department continues to monitor settlements covering the Los Angeles Police 
Department, the New Jersey State Police, the Steubenville, Ohio Police Department 
and the Pittsburgh  Bureau  of  Police.”  Id. 
142 See 42 U.S.C. § 14141(b)  (2006)  (“[T]he  Attorney  General,  for  or  in  the  name  of  
the United States, may in a civil action obtain appropriate equitable and declaratory 
relief to eliminate  the  practice.”). 
143 See Memorandum of Agreement Between the United States and the City of Mt. 
Prospect, Illinois 3 (Jan. 22, 2003) [hereinafter Memorandum of Agreement], 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/mtprospect_moa.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 8, 2011) (listing the different procedures the police department was required to 
implement pursuant to the written policy). 
144 Letter  from  Shanetta  Y.  Cutlar,  Chief,  Special  Litigation  Section,  U.S.  Dep’t  of  
Justice,  to  Subodh  Chandra,  Director,  Dep’t  of  Law, City of Cleveland 1 (Feb. 9, 
2004), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/cleveland_uof_final.pdf (agreement 
required the modification of the use of force policy, including prohibiting officers 
from  “intentionally  firing  at  moving vehicles unless there is imminent danger of 
death or serious injury, and other means are not available to avert or eliminate the 
threat,  and,  where  feasible,  some  warning  has  been  given”);;  Press  Release,  U.S.  
Dep’t  of  Justice,  Justice  Department  Reaches  Agreement with Buffalo Police 
Department to Resolve Police Misconduct Investigation (Sep. 19, 2002),  
http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2002/September/02_crt_535.htm (agreement 
required the modification of the use of force policy specifically for the use of 
chemical sprays by implementing a new policy, but also required the police 
department to revise general use of force policies and procedures for reporting all 
uses of force); Memorandum of Agreement, United States Department of Justice and 
the District of Columbia and the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police 
Department (Jun. 13, 2001), 
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DOJ has also required the implementation of an early warning 
tracking system to help supervisors identify officers who might need 
to be re-trained or disciplined.145 Collecting this type of information 
and using it to make training and personnel decisions may deter the 
intentional wrongdoing of individual officers.  
 
Another DOJ reform entailed the implementation of fair and 
comprehensive complaint processes for citizens who wish to report 
alleged misconduct. 146  Many citizens, especially minorities, are 
reluctant to file complaints against police officers because they simply 
believe that their complaints will not be fairly processed.147 To ensure 
fairness and reduce the possibility for retaliation, officers assigned to 
investigate citizen complaints should be sufficiently independent from 
the officers they are investigating. DOJ has also required several                                                                                                                                   
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/dcmoa.php  (the agreement required 
the police department to implement general use of force policy modifications that 
emphasized de-escalation procedures, such as advisements, warnings, and verbal 
persuasion, as well as specific modifications regarding the use of firearms, canines 
and Oleoresin Capsicum Spray). 
145 See United States v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV 00-11769 GAF (RCx) (C.D. 
Cal.) (Order Re:  Transition Agreement), at 5–7, 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/US_v_LosAngeles_TA-
Order_071709.pdf (mandating the continued use of a Training, Evaluation, and 
Management  System  (“TEAMS  II”)  “in  the  manner in which it was intended – an 
early  warning  or  risk  management  system”);;  Memorandum  of  Agreement  Between  
the United States Department of Justice and the City of Buffalo, New York and the 
Buffalo Police Department, the Police Benevolent Association, Inc., and the 
American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees Local 264, 5–6,  
¶¶ 20–23 (Sep. 19, 2002), http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-NY-
0004-0001.pdf (requiring the creation of a management and supervision system for 
tracking excessive use of force incidents and complaints and using them to correct 
police  officer  conduct  through  evaluation  and  training,  akin  to  an  “early  warning  
system”);;  Memorandum of Agreement, United States Department of Justice and the 
District of Columbia and the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department, 
Section I(A)(2) (Jun. 13, 2001),  
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/dcmoa.php    (“[T]he Department of 
Justice has provided MPD with on-going technical assistance recommendations 
regarding its use of force policies and procedures, training, investigations, complaint 
handling, canine program and early warning tracking system. Based upon these 
recommendations, MPD has begun to implement necessary reforms in the manner in 
which it investigates, monitors,  and  manages  use  of  force  issues.”). 
146 See Memorandum of Agreement, supra note 143, at 7 (describing the complaint 
process available to members of the public). 
147 Police Brutality: Only a Minority, ECONOMIST (Aug. 21, 1997), available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/154487. 
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jurisdictions to compile information related to racial profiling. 148  
Compiling and publishing information related to race and stops and 
searches may help jurisdictions determine whether officers are 
disproportionately stopping racial minorities. With vigorous 
enforcement,  DOJ’s  pattern  or  practice  authority  could  lead  to  reforms  
that will ultimately address many of the systemic issues contributing to 
the inequities in policing. 
 
Finally, communities must insist that police departments 
implement less antagonistic models of policing. As the Boston Police 
Commissioner recently imparted to recruits at the police academy, 
“[officers]   shouldn’t   come   out of the academy now thinking of 
[them]selves as soldiers ready for battle, but as problem-solvers in this 
city’s  neighborhoods.”149 And the community may even be willing to 
support more surveillance in the form of less intrusive methods such 
as strategically placed cameras that might capture crimes committed 
by citizens and Fourth Amendment violations committed by the 
police.150   
 
Serious conversations about the poor and police surveillance 
should be refocused on the legislative efforts and public policies that 
change the manner in which police officers prevent and investigate 
criminal activity in impoverished neighborhoods. In conclusion, the 
focus must be upon solutions that do not rely upon a shift in the 
Court’s   jurisprudence,   but   solutions   for   which   local communities 
could advocate and implement.       
                                                        
148 See Memorandum of Agreement, supra note 143, at 7 (describing the complaint 
process available to members of the public). 
149 Peter Gelzinis, Hub’s  New  Top  Cop  Has  Persevered,  BOSTON HERALD, Jan. 21, 
2014. 
150 See Capers, supra note 87, at 977–89 (advocating for more surveillance in the 
form of video cameras as a way to increase safety and encourage more egalitarian 
and race-neutral policing). 
